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Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 094Abstract
If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long{term employment is risky, with
the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long{
term employment can result either from oering long{term contracts or from repeatedly
and mutually opting for rematching. Treatments dier in how regulations restrict the
employer's 
exibility in adapting the employment contract to changes of the market
(wage). All treatments allow for longer contract duration as well as for mutually opting
to be rematched. Eort is chosen by employees after a contract is concluded. Treatments
vary from no 
exibility to no restriction at all. Will more (downward) 
exibility be used
in ongoing employment but reduce eciency? If so, deregulation may weaken rather than
promote labor market eciency. And will regulation crowd out long{term employment,
either in the form of long{term contracts or voluntary rematching?
JEL classication: C72, C90, F16, J21, J24, L10
Keywords: deregulation, employment contracts, wage 
exibility, principal-agent theory,
experimental economics, repeated interaction
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Oering an employment contract that regulates working conditions for many periods,
although little is known about the future market conditions, can be dangerous. If market
wages drastically decline, one may hire labor more cheaply. Furthermore, an employee
may turn out less reliable than expected. Such risks are by no means far{fetched but
concern crucial aspects of long term employment.1 So why is long{term employment still
predominant and short{term employment, e.g. in the form of rented labor, rare, albeit
increasing (see Alewell, Friedrich, G uth, & Kuklys, 2007)? An explanation might be the
increasing institutional 
exibility regarding wage adjustments. In our paper, we want
to study, if more 
exibility in wage adjustment (from none to full 
exibility) increases
the duration of accepted employment contracts. This dependence of contract duration
on contract 
exibility constitutes our rst hypothesis (Hypothesis A) which we want
to test experimentally.
One obvious argument for long{term employment is that oering a short{term con-
tract reveals distrust in the newly hired worker and encourages shirking. But what is
wrong with long{term employment, resulting from both partners, employer and em-
ployee, repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching? Another reason for long{term
employment could be that, on the long race, the interacting parties can more easily
overcome eciency losses due to opportunistic behavior. In our experimental scenario,
regulations prevent ecient employment contracts when workers react opportunistically.
But do long{term employees care more for eciency by investing more than optimal ef-
forts?
Deregulation2 has been the major policy recommendation for nearly all developed
market economies. However, earlier experimental ndings (Berninghaus et al., 2008)
question that labor market eciency is higher in deregulated markets. To answer more
systematically whether the usual intuition that wage rigidities question eciency or ear-
lier results are more reliable we want to analyze more thoroughly the interdependency of
wage 
exibility and employment duration. Our second hypothesis claims that long-term
contracts are substituted by renewed contracts when contracts become more in
exible
(Hypothesis B). Compared to our previous study where we varied only the 
exibility
of xed wages, now also piece rates may be adapted periodically.
In the experiment of Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) where work contracts just last
for one period long-term relationships between employers and employees can only be
established if the employer oers in each period a new contract to the same employee.
We also allow for voluntary renewal of contracts at the end of each period. But in
addition to the possibility of oering contracts which extend for more than one period.
With respect to employment duration our discussion is related to the (in)completeness
of employment contracts (for contract theory, see Schmidt, 1996; Schweizer, 1999) and
thereby to the crowding out or crowding in of long{term employment. Will more reg-
1Similar problems can, of course, show up in love relationships (see Berninghaus, Bleich, & G uth,
2008). Here we will not refer to and elaborate such analogies any further.
2See e.g. Galt (1995), McCabe (1994), Spiller and Cardilli (1997) for the telecommunication indus-
tries and Briggs and Buchanan (2000), Esping-Andersen and Regini (2000) for labor markets.
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ment, e.g. in the sense that that long{term employment is intended but not contractually
codied, or will long{term employment be crowded{out altogether?
In section 2, we introduce the stochastic, multi{period labor market model which
we have experimentally implemented. This model is theoretically analyzed in section
3. Section 4 contains the experimental design and the statistical analysis of our results.
The major ndings concerning our two main hypotheses show a strong tendency for
shorter contracts in more regulated markets (Hypothesis A) and more contract renewals
in less 
exible labor markets (Hypothesis B). Section 5 contains a detailed discussion on
policy implications.
2 The Stochastic Multi-period Environment
In the following we present the multi-period model which is suited for experimental
testing. The employers are allowed to oer either one-period or multi-period contracts
in reality are mostly open-ended.3
In every period t = 1;2;::::, the n ( 2) employers i = 1;2;:::;n and workers
j = 1;2;:::;n are matched to pairs. Each such pair can establish employment. If not,
there is no employment relation involving this employer and employee in this period. In
our view, such momentary take{it{or{leave{it power is rather realistic because usually it
is the employer who is aware of the job opportunity. Due to the multi{period interaction
such power is, however, restricted.
The rst period t = 1 precludes already existing employment relations. In t =
1, each employer i is randomly matched with one worker j: First, all 2n agents are
informed about the market wage wc
1 in this period without providing any clue about
future market wages wc
t in periods t > 1: In each pair (i;j), employer i then oers










i ( 0) denoting the xed wage4, s
j
i 2 [0;1] the revenue share for the worker,
and T
j
i ( 1) the employment duration. If worker j accepts, he nally chooses his eort
level e
j














where pi (> 0) is rm i's sale price and cj (> 0) worker j's eort cost parameter, whereas
employer i earns







3Since in an experiment the number of periods is limited, our long-term contracts cannot be open-
ended.
4Except for very rare instances like waiters in US{restaurants who sometimes must buy their ta-
bles, wages cannot be negative although negative wages might alleviate the moral hazard problem of
employment contracts.
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oer, he is employed externally at the market wage wc
1; whereas i earns nothing in that
period.
In periods t > 1, the market wage wc
t is made known rst without any clue concerning
wc
 for  > t: What may dier from period 1 is that some pairs (i;j) have already decided
to go on with their employment relationship, possibly after adjusting the contract where
the 
exibility depends on the treatment. In all periods t  1 :
- In ongoing relationships (i;j), employer i decides whether and how to adjust the
contract to which employee j can react by his eort choice e
j
i, whereas
- in newly matched pairs (i;j), the process is the same as in the rst period (i oers
a contract which j either rejects to be employed externally at the market wage wc
t
or accepts and chooses his eort e
j
i).
Clearly, there can be at most n ongoing relations (i;j), and each employer i without
employee can be matched with an unemployed worker j: Only newly matched pairs
can, furthermore, fail to establish employment, meaning that i earns nothing and j the
market wage wc
t. It may appear unrealistic, that the employee cannot simply leave her
employer in case of a long{term contract.5 But if the employee can simply run away,
this questions long{term contracts altogether. Furthermore, even when staying with her
employer, the employee is by no means defenseless since she can react to unfair treatment
by zero eort.
When an employment relation expires, both partners can opt for rematching. Only
when both agree, will these two be rematched; otherwise i and j will be randomly
matched with any of the unemployed workers j; respectively employers i without a
worker. Full 
exibility can be achieved irrespective of the 
exibility treatment by re-
newed short{term contracts with the same partner. We can thus test the crowding out
of long{term employment in two ways: restricting 
exibility in adjusting employment
contracts reduces either contract length T
j
i or voluntary employment duration, i.e., by
reducing mutual rematching.
Of course, an employer may not exploit the 
exibility in adjusting the contract
terms and, when the employer exploits downward 
exibility, the employee may accept
such adjustments to market conditions without reducing eorts. In view of our earlier
preliminary ndings (Berninghaus et al., 2008), and also the inspiring and illustrative
discussion of Irlenbusch (2008) we predict the opposite: 
exibility of downward adjust-
ments will be used by employers, and this encourages shirking by employees to an extent
that renders such downward adjustments unprotable and inecient.
3 Theoretical Analysis
The following rational choice analysis assumes common (knowledge of) risk neutrality
and rst discusses the one{period interaction before continuing with repeated interaction
5Think about soccer professionals who would not be hired otherwise unless their contract has expired.
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strategic problem of an employer and an employee concluding a new contract in the
only, respectively the nal period of the experiment or of myopic actors.










If the market wage wc also determined the xed wages, i.e., for w
j
i = wc; the optimal
revenue share would result in s
j
i = 1
2: Thus worker j would earn wc + p2
i=8cj: This
benchmark behavior could be justied by a collectively negotiated legal minimum wage.
If rms are restricted in t = 1 to w
j
i  0; respectively in a later round t to w
j
i   w for
some given positive  w in ongoing employment, the optimal revenue share can be derived
by maximizing
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> 0 for all 0  s
j
i < 1, the global optimum would be obtained for s
j
i = 1: This
fullls the requirement of w
j
i  0 if wc 
p2
i
2cj; what is violated for all possible market
wages wc in our experiment. Similarly, one must have wc   w +
p2
i
2cj for a positive wage
 w due to long{run employment and in
exibility of w
j
i: Revenue shares s
j
i = 1 would of
course mean that the employer is renting out her rm to the employee for a xed fee in
the sense of w
j
i < 0 what we exclude by restricting w
j
i to non{negative levels.
When s
j
i = 1 is excluded, a boundary solution requires 1
2 < s
j




optimal for given xed wages and s
j




2cj the binding constraint w
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observe only one-period oers with a piece rate depending on the market wage of that
period and a zero xed wage. This combination guarantees the employee the market
wage, given an optimal eort choice.
Finitely repeated interaction: When T is nite and commonly known, the usual
backward induction can be applied. The benchmark solution of the one shot{interaction
applies in the last round t = T, when a pair is voluntarily or randomly formed in the last
round, or when both parties are (known to be) myopic. But this does not provide the
usual starting point for a stationary benchmark solution as in repeated games without
any structural dependencies across rounds.
To illustrate the possible gains by contractual eort smoothing, consider the second
last round of a nitely repeated interaction with a uniform distribution of market wages
on the integers of the interval [wc;wc] with wc < wc. For a newly formed pair (i;j)
one option in the second last round is to implement a contract with T
j
i = 1 and opt for
rematching in the last round. This would guarantee j the payo wc
T 1 in the current
round and the expected payo 0:5(wc+  wc) in the last round. To demonstrate eciency
gains due to eort smoothing we derive the optimal contract with T
j
i = 2, which makes



































i = 0; s+; T
j
i = 2) would grant employer i all possible gains from
contractual eort smoothing. It thus only remains to show that employer i prefers this
contract which, due to j's indierence, is acceptable to employee j: Neglecting the same
constant labor costs of employing worker j; contract (w
j
i = 0; s+; T
j
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constellations wc = 13 and  wc = 30 (see Appendix A).
In a similar vein, parties can perceive the last two rounds as just one terminal period
and convince themselves that contractual eort smoothing is even more protable when
extending it over more than just two rounds. Proceeding inductively, this would nally
prove that eort smoothing is optimally achieved by oering the longest possible contract
duration.6
The previous analysis applies to all situations with no downward 
exibility of piece
rates which guarantee the employee a certain positive payo. One of our experimental
treatments allows up- and downward changes of xed wage and piece rate over a long-
term contract. As the employer has full 
exibility after the employee once accepted the





i = 0. The employee takes this
into account when accepting a contract in a treatment with full 
exibility, the employer's
oer, therefore, has to compensate the employee for giving up the sum of the expected
market wages for the duration of the oered contract7
There is experimental evidence (e.g. Anderhub, G achter, & K onigstein, 2002) that
parties, especially employees, react optimally to whatever contract they are facing. As
shown by Brown et al. (2004), being together on a long race may encourage the parties,
however, to behave less opportunistically and be more eciency minded instead. For
the case at hand, maximizing the total surplus of a given employer i and employee j-pair




cj (i.e., ecient production), yielding the surplus of
p2
i
2cj, which both parties can freely allocate among themselves by an appropriate xed wage
w
j
i in the range w
j
i  0 and, if necessary, by a revenue share s
j
i 2 [0;1]. Of course, such a
policy would have to rely on trust and reciprocity. In the full 
exibility treatment F+, for
instance, the employee would have to trust in the reciprocity of her employer, whereas
in case of no 
exibility at all (treatment N), this would be reversed. Such eciency-
enhancing cooperation can also be achieved by voluntary and mutual rematching, i.e.,
without any codied obligation (see the corresponding evidence of Brown et al., 2004).
4 Experimental Procedures
4.1 Experimental Setting
The experiment was conducted at the University of Karlsruhe. Subjects were students
of dierent faculties. Treatments diered in 
exibility of contracts in ongoing long{term
employment due to T
j
i > 1:
6For a detailed derivation of the results, see Bleich (2009).
7For further analysis, see Bleich (2009): for the particular parameter values of our experimental
design, only a two-period contract would be oered with sF+ = 2
3 and wF+ = 0, with the xed wage
remaining at zero and the piece rate decreasing to one half for the rest of the contract's periods.
6
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experiment in discrete time. In each session, the ten participants represented a matching
group. Members of a matching group interacted for 10 rounds and were partitioned into
a group of ve employers and a group of ve employees8. Subjects without a given
partner were randomly rematched within their matching group after each round. All
subjects received an initial endowment of 7.50 Euro at the beginning of the experiment.
After reading the instructions (see Appendix B for the translated instructions) they
all had to ll out a computerized control questionnaire checking whether the rules are
understood. The experiment started when all questions were answered correctly.
In each round, after the employer-employee pairs were formed and the market wage
had been announced, the employer proposed a contract which could be accepted or
rejected by the employee, except when the pair was already engaged in a long{term
contract. After each round, a participant was informed about her current payo. Once
each participant in the matching group had made her decision, the next round started.
Participants were able to recall their payos of previous rounds at any time on the
computer screen.
Employer subjects had to choose xed wages w
j
i; revenue shares s
j
i; and duration of
contract T
j
i : Employee participants had to x their eort level ej in each period after
accepting the contract. At the beginning of each period, the prevailing market wage wc
t;
a random number uniformly distributed over a given interval of integers, was announced
to all subjects.









i integer with 1  T
j




Our ve treatments diered in labor market restrictions which limited wage or rev-
enue share 
exibility during contract duration. Starting with treatment N, exhibiting
complete regulation but still allowing eort choices to react to market wages, we ordered
the remaining treatments according to decreasing degrees of regulation in Table 1. Each
session involved one matching group (consisting of 10 subjects). Thus we employed 400
participants in total.
8Although one faces only ve potential candidates for the other role, a participant hardly ever met
the same participant twice (without, of course, being informed about this) due to the frequent constant
pair either by contract or by mutual consent. Furthermore, when meeting again the pair faces a dierent
market wage than before.
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i Sessions Employer Employee Both
N No No 6 18.14 18.11 18.12
I " No 11 14.98 20.13 17.03
I+ " " 6 13.88 19.17 16.52
F " # No 11 13.79 18.94 16.38
F+ " # " # 6 18.55 18.71 18.63
An upward arrow means that the respective variable may be increased, a downward
arrow that the variable can be decreased during contract duration. One could have
distinguished further treatments like no w
j
i but full s
j
i{
exibility or full 
exibility of one
component and only upward 
exibility of the other. But in our view, the ve treatments
systematically explore and compare the eects of (de)regulation and should suce to
check the robustness of whatever ndings. Accumulated payos of each participant were
paid out in cash anonymously shortly after the experiment.9 The average payo for all
treatments is given in the last three columns of Table 1 revealing already that employer
participants did not suer from in
exibility.
In the following data analysis we will
- compare the experimental ndings qualitatively with what (game) theory predicts,
- try to answer our basic research question whether stricter labor market restrictions
crowd out contractual or mutually consented employment duration.
4.2 Experimental Results
First, we give a descriptive overview of the data set. Table 2 provides the averages of the
most important variables. All averages except for eorts are calculated for the periods
in which a new contract was oered. We did this for a better comparison of treatments
with dierent rules of contract adjustment.10 Eort, however, is averaged over all eort
choices, i.e., periods with rejected contracts are omitted.11
9The exchange rate is 0.05 Euro per 1 ECU (experimental currency units).
10Thus the values in Table 2 represent the average values of the respective variables proposed in
contract oers.
11A rather simple idea is that direction (improved or worse contract terms) of contract changes
parallels the development of the (increased or decreased) market wage. We, however, could only conrm
8
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N I I+ F F+
Market wage 21.712 22.119 21.890 20.917 20.096
Fixed wage 13.039 11.449 9.667 12.075 11.718
Revenue share 0.493 0.532 0.534 0.523 0.541
Accepted [%] 72.0 73.1 76.8 70.7 71.8
Oered duration 1.311 1.539 1.430 1.737 1.973
Eort 8.000 6.466 6.506 6.568 7.695
We nd the highest acceptance rate in treatment I+, providing maximal insurance
against wage reductions without excluding upward wage adjustments. Employers oer
the shortest contract duration in case of no 
exibility (N) and the longest in case of
full 
exibility (F+). Eorts are highest in treatment N: employees seem to prefer
certain wage incomes and reward employers by higher eorts for such certainty. Purely
opportunistic employees should invest lowest eort levels in Treatment N. Revenue
shares are all near 0:5, seemingly a focal point for employers.12 Actually, the correlation
between changes in the market wage wc
t = wc
t   wc





i(t   1) is highly signicant13.
4.2.1 Interdependence Between Degree of Regulation and Contract Dura-
tion
A completely myopic employer would oer one{period contracts only, whereas a less
myopic employer may aim at \contractual eort smoothing" whenever possible, i.e.,
when allowed by wage 
exibility. Thus, we test which type of employer is prevailing
in the experiment. We expect to observe far-sighted employers, who oer long-term
contracts whenever optimal. Maximal duration always exceeds signicantly the actually




Result 1 Participants oer signicantly shorter than maximal contract duration, but
the average oered contract duration signicantly exceeds one period.
this for treatments I+ and F, where there is a positive correlation between changes in wc and changes
in the workers' utility.
12The relative frequencies of 0:5 piece rate oers are for increasing 
exibility of the treatment: 37%,
26%, 29%, 36%, and 28% respectively. These oers are the most frequent ones for all treatments.
132{test on the independence of moving directions of wt and wc
t at 5% signicance level.
14Because of eort smoothing, each employer should in each period oer a contract with maximum
duration.
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N I I+ F F+
Average 1.311 1.539 1.430 1.737 1.973
Average optimal14 5.498 5.468 5.536 5.637 5.878
Sign-Test on max. duration < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
Sign-Test on one-period < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
Overall we expected longer contracts in the less regulated treatments, especially
for treatments F and F+ where employers can positively and negatively respond to
workers' eort choices in a long-term contract. We tested the rst hypothesis applying
a Jonckheere-Terpstra Test on increasing duration with increasing 
exibility (from N to
F+). To test the second hypothesis, we applied a non-directional Kruskal-Wallis One-
Way ANOVA on Ranks15 and isolated by Dunn's Method the treatments causing the
dierence. Both tests support our hypotheses:
Result 2 Oered contract duration is increasing with increasing contractual 
exibility.
Treatments F and F+ dier signicantly from the remaining treatments.
As an oer does not necessarily lead to a contract, we also tested the duration of
concluded contracts for trends over treatments. Again, a Jonckheere-Terpstra test shows
that duration of accepted contracts increases with increasing 
exibility of wages.
Result 3 The duration of accepted contracts increases with increasing 
exibility of con-
tracts what altogether supports our Hypothesis A: more 
exibility in adapting contract
conditions to the actual environment favors contracts with larger duration.
4.2.2 Acceptance Decisions
Confronted with a contract oer, a rational worker should check whether the expected
income of the contract is larger than, or equal to, the expected income from only one-
period contracts based on optimal values of piece rate s and eort e.16 We look at actual
and optimal acceptance of contract oers in Table 4. A contract is called \ optimally
accepted", whenever the worker's income from it is larger than the expected income
from one-period contracts over the same number of periods.
15The dierence is highly signicant (H=51.427; P< 0:001). To isolate the treatments causing the
dierence, we compare pairwise with Dunn's Method. The values of the test variable Q indicate, at the
5% level, signicant dierences between treatments F, respectively F+ and the remaining treatments.
16These contracts give a worker just the period's market wage.
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N I I+ F F+
Actual acceptance [%] 72.0 73.1 76.8 70.7 71.8
Optimal acceptance [%] 87.5 88.8 89.9 69.2 62.8
Sign-Test < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 0:245 0:011
Actual acceptance rates signicantly dier from acceptance rates based on optimality
in all treatments except F. For treatments with only upward 
exibility, contracts are less
often than optimal accepted, in treatments with a possibility to lower the wage(s) more
contracts are accepted. Workers do not seem to fear exploitation in treatments allowing
employers to punish employees with low eorts. To answer whether the acceptance rate
of long-term contracts is higher in treatments with a more restricted adaptation of rev-
enue shares, an ANOVA on Ranks has been performed, showing no signicant dierence
in acceptance behavior of workers across treatments regarding long-term contracts.
Result 4 Workers' contract acceptance behavior is neither optimal nor can it be ex-
plained by fear of exploitation.
To explore the determinants of the workers' acceptance decision in more detail, we
ran regressions whose detailed results are presented in Appendix C, Table 7. Revenue
share and xed wage have a positive eect on acceptance. All other determinants (oered
duration, a new-contract dummy and the market wage) deter employees from acceptance.
These results additionally conrm Result 4 that contract acceptance does not depend
on the treatment.
4.2.3 Eort Choices
After accepting a contract, workers choose eort, where their choice is limited to positive
values. The optimal eort e = 10  s does not depend on the xed wage. Hence, our
next aim is to test the optimality of eort choices given oered piece rates. Table 5 gives
an overview of the results.17 All workers' eort choices were compared pairwise with
the optimal eort in the respective period by applying a Sign-Test for each treatment
separately. As can be seen from the Pearson Product-Moment correlations in Table 5,
the correlation between actual and optimal eort choice is positive and highly signicant.
The Sign-Tests show that in all treatments, except N, there is a signicant dierence in
the distribution of actual and optimal eort in the sense that workers exert more eort
17Here we excluded eort choices leading to detrimental losses and re
ecting highly irrational behav-
ior.
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N I I+ F F+
Actual eort 5.226 5.928 5.523 6.189 5.780
Optimal eort 5.119 5.373 5.353 5.468 5.499
Pearson Corr. 0.833 0.589 0.797 0.590 0.707
P(Pearson) < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001
P(Sign-Test) 0.360 < 0:001 0:0013 < 0:001 < 0:001
than optimal. This may be due to the in
exibility of treatment N, where workers' eorts
can neither be rewarded nor punished.
Result 5 Workers' eort choices in treatment N are nearly optimal, otherwise workers
exert more eort than optimal.
To analyze the determinants of eort choices in more detail, we ran three regressions
on selected variables. The results in Table 8 (Appendix C) show that both, the xed wage
rate and the revenue share, have a signicantly positive in
uence on the workers' eort
decision.18 The coecient for revenue shares is much higher than that for xed wages.
We conclude { in line with theory { that piece rates are the most important determinant
for workers' eort choices. Furthermore, the regressions reveal some learning. The
negative time trend together with our results in Table 5 (higher than optimal eorts in
almost all treatments) show that higher than optimal eort levels are mainly observed
in the early periods, suggesting early reputation concerns of employee participants.
4.2.4 Are Long-term Contracts More Protable?
To gain from eort-smoothing (see section 3) rms should prefer long-term contracts. To
check the interdependence between contract duration and prots we computed Pearson-
Moment Correlations between the duration of accepted contracts and the resulting prof-
its to employers for all treatments separately. We did not nd any signicant interde-
pendence and thus conclude:
Result 6 Employers do not prot from increased contract duration: there are no gains
from eort smoothing to employers in long-term contracts.
According to Result 6 eort smoothing seems a rather far fetched theoretical possi-
bility which participants either do not recognize or simply discard.
18We included a last contract period dummy to isolate endgame eects. To avoid collinearity problems
with the last period dummy, we did not include contract duration.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 094Figure 1: Workers' and Employers' Average Gains
If deregulation in form of higher contractual 
exibility increases eciency, we should
nd this in our data. First, we test employers' gains from concluded contracts over treat-
ments. A Jonckheere-Terpstra test on increasing employer gains results in signicantly
increasing gains, when 
exibility is increased. Although we found in Result 3, that also
contract duration increases with 
exibility, we cannot support a causal interdependence
between contract duration and employer gains (from eort smoothing). We executed
the same test for workers' prots and also for the sum of prots (net joint prots). Net
joint prots, which can be seen as an indicator for eciency, also signicantly increase,
whereas workers' prots signicantly decrease. Thus deregulation increases eciency,
regardless of contract duration. Workers' decreasing payos have to be interpreted with
caution: They result mainly from their high eorts (see Result 5). In Figure 1, we see
that workers' average prots are higher than employers' for all treatments.
Result 7 Employers' gains and net joint prots increase with contractual 
exibility.
Workers' gains are lower in case of more 
exible contracts.
4.2.5 Are Long-term Contracts Crowded Out by Renewed Contracts?
Table 6 shows how employers and employees deal with short-term, long-term, and re-
newed contracts. The percentages of short- and long-term contracts oered add up to
100%. Renewed contracts may be short-term or long-term. Oered and accepted con-
tract duration increases with the 
exibility of the treatment. The same unambiguous
assertion cannot be made for renewed contracts: Between 19 and 34% of the contracts
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pairing: if only one contract partner opts for rematching, in most cases it is the employer
and this tendency seems to increase with contractual 
exibility. Overall, employers opt
for another round with the same employee at about 75% of ending contracts only, in
treatment N they do this in about 60% of all cases.
Table 6: Short{ and long{term contracts
percentages N I I+ F F+
Short-term oer 76.7 74.3 75.1 62.9 53.7
and conditional acceptance19 77.2 77.5 80.3 78.9 78.2
Long-term oer 23.3 25.7 24.9 37.1 46.3
and conditional acceptance 55.0 60.4 66.1 56.8 64.4
Renewed oer 22.2 30.1 34.2 30.8 18.6
Only one opts for renewal 52.1 41.5 41.8 39.1 50.0
The one is the employer 45.9 56.2 65.2 69.6 87.3
Employers opting for rematching 58.9 74.9 78.5 79.5 74.5
Treatments signicantly dier with respect to the percentage of contract oers in
renewed pairings and the percentage of oering long- and short-term contracts.20 We
nd support for our main hypothesis (Hypothesis B), that in more regulated markets
long-term contracts are replaced by contract renewals (more short-term and fewer long-
term contracts from treatment N to F+).
Result 8 The percentages of contract oers in renewed relationships as well as those of
long-term contracts dier signicantly over treatments.
The missing trend in the frequency of renewed contracts may be caused by heteroge-
nous durations of renewed contracts. What determines the decision to opt for rematch-
ing? Do employers oer a new contract to a worker when the match was successful in the
sense of positive prots? And do workers opt for rematching after a positive experience
with an employer? We used the 2-test to see how opting for rematching depends on the
payos of both partners. For employers, this decision always depends on the period's
payo, whereas for workers such dependency exists only in treatments I and F.
Result 9 Opting for rematching does not correlate with contractual 
exibility. Employ-
ers' behavior is in
uenced mainly by the payo extracted from the match; for employees
this is observed only in treatments I and F.
19Conditional acceptance is, e.g., the percentage of accepted short-term contracts.
202-test at 5% signicance level.
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In both, our theoretical analysis as well as in our experimental scenario, \going on the
long race" in the sense of long{term employment has been possible in two ways: by
oering and accepting longer contract duration or by mutually agreeing on rematching.
Thus, although the ve treatments cover nearly the full spectrum of no to full 
exibility
in adapting contract terms, one could always have established long{term employment
without bothering how regulated the labor market is.
In the experiment employers seem to follow a behavioral benchmark instead of acting
optimally: xed wages are signicantly positive, piece rates divide the returns from eort
equally and oered contract duration is signicantly shorter than would be optimal for
eort smoothing. Also employees' answers dier from optimal ones. They accept more
contracts than optimal for N to I+ and less for F and F+. Eort is higher than optimal:
to piece rates of about 50% oered by employer participants, they react with eort levels
between 6.5 and 8, whereas optimal eorts range only between 5.2 and 6.2. Nevertheless,
the oered and accepted contract durations (Results 2 and 3), eort levels (Result 5),
as well as opting for rematching (Result 9) dier signicantly between treatments.
Employers oer contracts with longer duration in treatments with higher 
exibility
and the accepted contract length increases. Thus, our hypothesis regarding the in
uence
of labor market 
exibility on contract duration is conrmed (Hypothesis A). Employers'
prots increase when regulation decreases. Longer contract duration, however, does not
generate increasing gains for employers. Workers' gains are lower when contracts are
more 
exible, but (see Figure 1) they always get more than 50% of the pie. Opting for
rematching by employers also seems to increase in a more 
exible labor market regime
(Hypothesis B). Employees seem to exploit the situation with in
exible contracts where
they cannot be punished for low eorts. This leads to low gains for employers, who do
not want to be matched again with the same worker (Result 9).
After all, what can we say about policy implications? Does (de)regulation of labor
markets really pay? Do deregulated markets work more eciently? Unfortunately,
our results do not re
ect an unambiguous answer. This can mainly be reduced to the
problem of ordering increasing market 
exibility \correctly". The tables in our paper
suggest a 
exibility ordering  of treatments like N  I  I+  F  F+; where
A  B means that market organization B is more 
exible than market organization
A: However, this ordering of our treatments is not a \natural" one. One could, e.g.,
similarly argue that F  I+ constitutes a reasonable 
exibility ordering between two
labor market institutions. Thus, measuring 
exibility of markets by a simple binary
ordering is not a trivial task.
Keeping this caveat in mind, we will, nevertheless, argue that, given a generally ac-
cepted 
exibility ordering of markets which might be based on the ordering  above and
regarding the average eorts choices as a measure of market eciency we actually nd a
strictly increasing monotone relationship between market 
exibility and market eciency
provided treatment I+ is omitted. Unfortunately, there is a sharp monotone decrease in
eciency from treatment I to treatment I+ what destroys a monotone relation over all
treatments.
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further research. Employees might feel \disappointed" in treatment I+ that employers
do not exercise the, compared to the restrictions in treatment I; upward 
exibility of
piece rates in adapting to a new market environment and, therefore might react by eort
reduction.21
Finally, how aects (de)regulation the average employment duration between employer{
employee pairs? Assuming the same 
exibility ordering  between our treatments as
above and omitting the critical treatment I+ again we obtain a humb-shaped curve de-
scribing the dependence between market 
exibility and average employment duration.
Maximum employment duration is obtained in treatment I.22
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A The Eciency of Eort Smoothing
To show that T
j
i = 2 is preferred by employer i to repeated one-period contracts, we
have to check that the following inequality
2(1   s
+)s
+   (1   s
(wT 1))s





holds for any wT 1 2 f13;:::;30g:
Let us denote the left-hand side of this inequality by Diff(w): Inserting the param-
eter values of our experimental design p = 10; c = 1, we obtain the explicit expression
Di (w) = 0:141421
p
43 + 2w   0:141421
p
w   0:650804:
The diagram shows how Di () depends on w:
Di remains positive over the whole range of wages w 2 f13;::::;30g; supporting our
statement that contractual eort smoothing pays (in the two-period scenario). By
reformulating the problem, we analyze how the protability advantage of a two-period
contract depends on the range of the distribution of market wages. To avoid technicali-
ties, we consider uniform market wage distributions with increasing minimum wage wc
while keeping the maximum wage  wc constant.23 We vary the minimum wage from 13
to 30. The result is illustrated for selected wc-values by the second diagram.
23By shifting the probability mass of the original uniform wage distribution equally onto larger w-
values, the resulting distributions with larger wc-values dominate the preceding distributions with re-
spect to rst order Stochastic Dominance.
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variance of the market wage shrinks. Intuitively, this is what one would expect. It pays
more to oer a long{term contract when the \uncertainty" of the market wage increases.
B Translated Instructions
The instructions presented below are those for treatment I: It is easy to see how they
should be used for the remaining treatments. The German instructions use a shorthand
for variables which we related to German vocabulary used. We kept this notation for
reasons of authenticity rather than substituting them by those in the theoretical analysis,
related to the English vocabulary.
In this experiment you can earn real money, which will be paid out in cash at the
end of the experiment. The experiment lasts for 10 periods. How much you earn
depends on your decision and the decisions of the other participants. Every participant
makes her decisions isolated from the others, sitting at separate computer terminals.
Communication among participants is not allowed.
A participant will be randomly assigned the role of an employer (AG) or a worker (AN).
She will be informed about her role at the beginning of the experiment and will keep
this role until the end.
Every participant receives an initial endowment of 150 CU (currency units).
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At the beginning of each period, the period's market wage M will be announced to all
members of a group. For this wage rate each worker will be able to nd employment in
case of not being contracted by an employer. Only the market wage of the present period
will be announced, market wages of future periods are not known. Every employer is
randomly matched with one of the workers and oers her a contract. This consists
of the xed wage, the contract duration, and the revenue share of the produced
quantity. Each worker can accept or refuse this contract oer. If she accepts, she chooses
the planned product quantity. Employers and workers are paid according to the contract.
When a contract expires, employers and workers are asked if they want to interact again
with the same person in the next period. If both agree, they are matched again in the
next period.
First-round procedure
1. The random market wage for the present round is announced, which can vary
between 13 and 30.
2. Employer-worker pairs are randomly selected.
3. The employer oers a contract characterized by the following items:
 A xed wage F (in CU), where F  0.
 A share a, where 0  a  1 of the total production.
 The contract duration L, where
1  L  number of remaining periods:
4. Workers see the contract oered by \their" employers and decide to accept it or
not. If the contract is not accepted, the worker receives the prevailing market wage
M; and the employer has zero return.
5. If the contract is accepted, the worker chooses the production quantity Q; which
is sold for 10 CU. The division of the production quantity is determined by a.
The worker's return from an accepted contract in this round is given by:
F + 10  aQ   1=2  Q
2:
The employer's return is given by:
10  (1   a)Q   F:
If the worker refuses the contract, she receives the prevailing market wage. The
employer has zero return.
6. Per-period earning and the sum of all previous periods' earnings are presented (in
CU) on the computer screen.
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For participants not yet restricted by a long{term contract, the procedure in the follow-
ing rounds does not dier from the rst round, where the oered contract duration is
restricted to the number of the remaining rounds. For employer-employee pairs bound
by a long{term contract, the employer may increase the xed wage after the market
prevailing in this round has been announced. Then the workers decide how much to
produce.
If a contract has expired, both partners are asked if they want to be matched again with
the same partner in the next period. If both agree, they can enter a new contract in the
next round. Otherwise, both are randomly matched with another participant.
Please consider that in a long{term contract the worker's production share and the
contract duration do not change, while the xed wage may be raised by the employer in
each round. In a contract modied in this way, the increased xed wage is automatically
accepted. The worker may change the production quantity in every contract period.
\History"
During the experiment you can call up your \history" at any time by pressing the
button at the lower border of your computer screen or by pressing the F1 key. The fol-
lowing information about previous rounds is given: prevailing market wage, xed wage,
production share, remaining contract periods, acceptance of oers, quantity produced,
employer's return, employee's return.
Payo
You will be paid immediately after the experiment is nished. The return of all rounds
is added up and converted into euro at the exchange rate of 0.05 euro per CU. Payment
is made anonymously.
Questionnaire
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked, via the computer screen, some questions
on the rules of the experiment. If you do not understand a question, please ask the
experimenter.
Summary of notation
a worker's production share, 0  a  1
F xed wage, 0  F  60
L contract duration, 1  L  number of remaining periods
M market wage M 2 13;14;:::;30
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Table 7: Logit regression of contract acceptance
1 2 3 4
Constant24 -0.909 (0.459) -0.779 (0.428) -0.842 (0.439) -0.723 (0.408)
0.047 0.069 0.055 0.077
Oered duration -0.461 (0.062) -0.467 (0.062) -0.468 (0.062) -0.473 (0.062)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Fixed wage 0.163 (0.015) 0.162 (0.014) 0.162 (0.015) 0.161 (0.014)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Revenue share 8.410 (0.705) 8.424 (0.705) 8.421 (0.707) 8.433 (0.707)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
New contract -0.752 (0.162) -0.770 (0.161) -0.762 (0.162) -0.779 (0.160)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Market wage -0.143 (0.016) -0.143 (0.016) -0.141 (0.016) -0.141 (0.016)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
I 0.129 (0.202) 0.125 (0.202) { {
0.523 0.537
I+ 0.376 (0.232) 0.370 (0.231) { {
0.104 0.110
F -0.059 (0.200) -0.064 (0.200) { {
0.767 0.748
F+ 0.030 (0.247) 0.028 (0.247) { {
0.904 0.910
Period 0.019 (0.024) { 0.018 (0.024) {
0.429 0.456
Likelihood Ratio 337.159 336.532 332.342 331.786
p-Value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
24The rst entries in Table 7 represent the -values of the regression, the numbers in brackets denote
the standard deviation, and the term below indicates the p-value.
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1 2 3
Constant 4.883 (1.836) 4.973 (1.529) 3.951 (1.388)
0.008 0.001 0.004
Fixed wage 0.059 (0.028) 0.066 (0.027) 0.063 (0.026)
0.037 0.013 0.016
Revenue share 8.184 (1.958) 8.434 (1.905) 8.193 (1.900)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Period -0.398 (0.104) -0.407 (0.103) -0.412 (0.103)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001
I -1.839 (0.925) -1.801 (0.921) {
0.047 0.051
I+ -1.560 (1.038) -1.520 (1.036) {
0.133 0.143
F -1.565 (0.932) -1.515 (0.923) {
0.093 0.101
F+ -0.521 (1.056) -0.463 (1.036) {
0.622 0.655
Market wage 0.027 (0.056) { {
0.629
Last contract period dummy -0.389 (0.655) { {
0.553
R2 0.0252 0.0249 0.0215
Adjusted R2 0.0197 0.0206 0.0197
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